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NOTES

CIRCUIT COURT INTERPRETATIONS OF
GARCETTI V. CEBALLOS AND THE DEVELOPMENT

OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEE SPEECH
Thomas Keenan*
INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court has firmly established that the First Amendment's ambit covers the speech of public employees,' but the extent
of that coverage is subject to certain constraints. One such restriction,
as pronounced in Garcetti v. Ceballos,2 consists of a categorical denial
of the Constitution's protection for speech made "pursuant to [an
employee's] official duties."3 Unfortunately, the Court in Garcetti
explicitly refused to provide a definite framework for delineating the
scope of employment.4 Instead, the Court merely stated that "[t] he
proper inquiry is a practical one."'
* Candidate forJuris Doctor, University of Notre Dame Law School, 2012; B.A.,
History, Georgetown University, 2008. I would like to offer my sincere gratitude to
Dean Richard W. Garnett for his invaluable assistance in the preparation of this Note.
I also would like to thank my family for their unwavering support, and the staff of the
Notre Dame Law Review for their sacrifices in editing this work.
1 See, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (recognizing that
the First Amendment protects the speech of public employees to some extent).
2 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
3 Id. at 421.
4 Id. at 424 ("First, as indicated above, the parties in this case do not dispute that
Ceballos wrote his disposition memo pursuant to his employment duties. We thus
have no occasion to articulate a comprehensive framework for defining the scope of
an employee's duties in cases where there is room for serious debate.").
5 Id.
841
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Though many have characterized Garcetti as a hallmark of formalism in its adoption of an absolute prophylactic rule, 6 the decision "has
provided considerable room for the circuit courts to carve out . . .
their unique and circuit-specific determinations of the [case's]
import."7 For these courts, concluding that an employee's speech
falls within or without his or her official duties has become an indeterminate affair. Though the circuits do share a number of tests,
Garcetti's nebulous language has allowed great leeway for courts to
adopt their own unique approaches. As a result, the process of resolving a public employee's scope of employment for First Amendment
purposes often varies with the jurisprudence of the individual circuits.
More importantly, even where a court can plainly ascertain the scope
of employment, Garcetti's categorical holding provides no leeway for
speech of such public importance that it may deserve constitutional
protection despite the fact that it exists because of the employee's official duties.
This Note aims to shed light on the similarities and discrepancies
that exist among the federal circuit courts" in defining the scope of
official duties according to Garcetti's mandate, as well as to propose a
new take on the public employee speech analysis. Part I begins with a
very brief history of the development of the First Amendment jurisprudence regarding public employee speech, including an analysis of
the Supreme Court's holding in Garcetti. Part II delves into the vast
array of circuit court constructions of Garcetti. This includes an examination of the factors that the circuits share as well as those that are
distinctive to certain courts. Finally, Part III examines circuit decisions that seemingly take an expansive view of the scope of employment. The Part also addresses certain defenses and criticisms of
Garcetti and its subsequent implementation by the courts of appeals,
ending with a proposal for the future of the First Amendment's application to public employee speech. Specifically, the law should return
to a balancing standard in resolving these types of cases, where the
6 See, e.g., Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes, Public Employee Speech Rights FallPrey to an
EmergingDoctrinalFormalism, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTs.J. 1173, 1191 (2007) ("But what
is disputable is whether these interests required an absolute prophylactic rule or
could instead be accommodated by the balancing standard employed by the lower
courts before Garcetti. . . . The majority indicated that its rule was preferable under
federalism and separation of powers principles.").
7 JoNel Newman, Will Teachers Shed Their FirstAmendment Rights at the Schoolhouse
Gate? The Eleventh Circuit's Post-Garcetti Jurisprudence, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 761, 786
(2009).
8 The scope of this Note is limited to an examination of the federal circuit courts
and their treatment of Garcetti.
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initial "scope of employment" inquiry is settled by a contextual analysis that focuses on those duties either plainly required by employers or
so intertwined as to be nearly inseparable.
I.

THE EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEE SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE

Until the latter half of the twentieth century, courts did not
accept the notion that the First Amendment might protect public
employee speech. Yet the last sixty years have yielded an intricate
jurisprudence extending the First Amendment to public employees in
limited circumstances. This Part presents a succinct history of the
Supreme Court's treatment of public employee speech, focusing especially on the Court's decision in Garcetti.
A.

The Pre-Garcetti Era

Constitutional recognition of public employee speech rights is a
relatively recent phenomenon. Until the middle part of the twentieth
century, public employees "enjoyed no recognized constitutional protection from conditions placed upon their employment, including
those that restricted constitutional rights, such as free speech."9
This all changed, however, in the 1950s and 1960s as the
Supreme Court began to acknowledge a place within the First Amendment for such speech. Most prominently, the Court in Pickering v.
Board of Education'o repudiated the position that "public employment . .. may be subjected to any conditions, regardless of how unreasonable."" At the same time, the Court could not deny the
government's "interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its
employees," interests that "differ significantly from those it possesses
in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general."12 To resolve these competing concerns, the Court instituted a
standard that balanced the employee's interest in speaking on "matters of public concern" against the government's interest in operational efficiency.' 3
The Court further refined this balancing approach in Connick v.
Myersl 4 by limiting recourse for employees who do not speak on mat9
Posey
10
11
12

Benjamin M. Smith, Note, Transforming the Public Employee Speech Standard in
v. Lake Pend Oreille: More than Meets the Eye, 2010 BYU L. REV. 285, 287.
391 U.S. 563 (1968).
Id. at 568 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967)).
Id.

13

Id.

14

461 U.S. 138 (1983).
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ters of public concern.' 5 Though it did not completely rule out constitutional safeguards for this type of speech, the Court did not deem
it appropriate for federal courts to intervene in personnel decisions
where public employees speak "not as . . . citizen [s] upon matters of
public concern, but instead . . . upon matters only of personal inter-

est."16 Accordingly, the initial question for courts became whether
the employee was speaking on an issue of public concern, or rather
simply on a matter of personal significance. This inquiry was "one of
law, not fact"17 and had to "be determined by the content, form, and
context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record."1 8 Only
if the speech entailed a matter of public relevance could a court then
proceed to Pickering's balancing standard.
B. Garcetti v. Ceballos
The Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on public
employee speech came in 2006 with the decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos.19 At issue were the statements of Richard Ceballos, a deputy district attorney who discovered misrepresentations in an affidavit
supporting a search warrant.20 Mr. Ceballos informed his superiors
about the inaccuracies and recommended that the case be dismissed. 2 ' Additionally, he testified about his misgivings during ajudicial hearing on a motion challenging the search warrant.2 2
Thereafter, Mr. Ceballos claimed that his employer subjected him to a
number of retaliatory actions.23
Adding to the foundation established by Pickering and Connick,
the Supreme Court held that "when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution
does not insulate their communications from employer discipline."2 4
Because Mr. Ceballos made his statements "as a prosecutor fulfilling a
responsibility," his speech did not warrant constitutional protection.25
However, the majority was quick to note that neither the location of
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

See id. at 147.
Id.
Id. at 148 n.7.
Id. at 147-48.
547 U.S. 410 (2006).
Id. at 413-14.
Id. at 414.
Id. at 414-15.
Id. at 415.
Id. at 421.
Id.
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the speech nor its subject matter was dispositive. 26 Instead, the controlling issue in adjudicating future cases must be whether an
employee spoke pursuant to his or her official duties because, in such
instances, "there is no relevant analogue to speech by citizens who are
not government employees."2 7 Limiting speech that "owes its existence to a public employee's professional responsibilities does not
infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private
citizen." 28
Motivating this decision was the government's "heightened interest ]" in controlling employee speech to preserve "substantive consistency and clarity" in communications that have official
consequences. 2 9 The mere potential for constitutional protection in
speaking on matters of public concern does not grant employees
license to perform theirjobs as they see fit.30 What is more, the majority wished to avoid "permanent judicial intervention in the conduct of
governmental operations," thereby averting any conflict with "sound
31
principles of federalism and the separation of powers."
Yet, because neither party in Garcetti contested the classification
of Mr. Ceballos's speech, the Court declined to establish a functional
32
test for determining the scope of employment for public employees.
Instead, it simply noted that the proper inquiry must be "a practical
one."3 3 The Court also discounted any notion that employers could
"restrict employees' rights by creating excessively broad job descriptions,"3 4 asserting that formal job descriptions are "neither necessary
nor sufficient to demonstrate" that an employee's speech fell within
his or her official duties.3 5 Lastly, the Court addressed the concern
that its ruling would discourage employees from exposing governmental misconduct, arguing instead that current whistleblower statutes
and other applicable laws, as well as those internal mechanisms that
government employers choose to install, provide sufficient safeguards
for those who seek to reveal such activity.3 6
26

See id. at 420-21.

27
28
29

Id. at 424.
Id. at 421-22.
Id. at 422.

30
31
33
34
35

See id.
Id. at 423.
See id. at 424.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 425.

36

See id. at 425-26.

32
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The majority's reasoning provoked a number of spirited dissents,
most notably from Justice David Souter. Principally, Justice Souter
argued that the presence of a government paycheck does "nothing to
eliminate the value to an individual of speaking on public matters,"
particularly government wrongdoing.3 7 As he pointed out, Pickerings
balancing test rests on the "recognition that public employees are
often the members of the community who are likely to have informed
opinions as to the operations of their public employers, operations
which are of substantial concern to the public."3 By categorically
redefining this test in relation to an employee's scope of employment,
Justice Souter maintained that the majority unreasonably deprived the
public of informed opinions on important public issues.39
Beyond this, Justice Souter believed that the Court's judgment
would have serious ramifications for future suits. In particular, this
supposed "practical" inquiry would not deter employers from defining
duties comprehensively; in fact it would actually stimulate fact-bound
litigation over the exact parameters of official duties. 40 Moreover, Justice Souter condemned the majority's faith in existing law, predicting
that certain speech claims addressing government misconduct would
fall outside current statutory definitions of whistleblowing. 4 1 The
combination of federal and state statutes would inevitably result in a
patchwork of statutory protection depending upon the jurisdiction. 4 2
To resolve this matter, Justice Souter encouraged a continued
reliance on the Pickering approach.4 3 This standard, he reasoned, as
opposed to a categorical rule, is feasible for two reasons. First, courts
could account for the government's efficiency interest by instituting
"a minimum heft" for speech that would not allow an employee to
prevail unless he or she was speaking "on a matter of unusual importance and satisfie [d] high standards of responsibility in the way he [or
she did] it."44 Second, the experience of courts, having dealt with
similar cases for several years, would facilitate the analysis's
perpetuation. 4 5
37 Id. at 428 (Souter, J., dissenting).
38 Id. at 433 (quoting City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82 (2004) (per
curiam)).
39 See id.
40 See id. at 436.
41 See id. at 440.
42 See id. at 440-41.
43 See id. at 434-35.
44 Id. at 435.
45 See id. at 435-36.
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In spite of these arguments, the current analysis in the wake of
Garcetti requires courts to make three inquiries. First, the court must
analyze a public employee's speech to determine if it was made pursuant to his or her official duties.4 6 If not, the court may then proceed
to ask whether the speech constitutes a matter of public concern.4 7 If
it is a matter of public concern, then the court may perform the Pickering balancing standard to establish which of the two interests holds
more weight, the employee's desire for free speech or the government's concern for operational efficiency. 48 If the employee's interest
prevails, only then does the speech merit First Amendment
protection.
II.

GARCETTI AND THE CIRCUITS

As soon as the Court handed down the Garcetti decision, the circuits faced a trial by fire as new retaliation claims filled their dockets.
Naturally, these courts turned to those limited instances in the Garcetti
opinion that presented some guidance as to the proper manner in
which they should determine scope of employment. This Part analyzes how the circuits have utilized the Garcettiopinion to craft a workable procedure for dealing with public employee speech claims,
exploring methods shared among the circuits as well as those unique
to particular courts.
A.

Circuit Interpretationsof Garcetti 's Language

Following from the Court's prescription for a "practical"
inquiry, 49 a number of circuits have explicitly engaged in contextual
examinations, focusing especially on audience and the location of an
employee's speech in relation to the official chain of command.5 0
Additionally, a few courts have paid special attention to formal job
descriptions, 5 ' though acknowledging Garcetti's instruction that such
listings are "neither necessary nor sufficient." 52 The majority of circuits5 3 have also relied extensively on the Supreme Court's restriction
of speech that "owes its existence to a public employee's professional
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53

See id. at 421 (majority opinion).
See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983).
See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424.
See infra Part II.A.1.
See infra Part II.A.2.
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425.
See infra Part II.A.3.
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responsibilities" 54 and consequently has "no relevant analogue to
speech by citizens who are not government employees."'5 5
1. Audience
As one commentator has contended, Garcetti "requires courts to
undertake a case-by-case analysis of the nature of an employee's duties
and of the context of the employee's speech."5 6 Citing Garcetti's practical inquiry language, several circuits have followed suit by structuring their approaches as fact-bound examinations. Though conceding
that neither the location nor the subject matter of an employee's
statements can be dispositive, 5 7 these courts in certain instances have
resorted to a "more commonsense, contextual analysis of the role the
public employee assumed in making the speech at issue in the case."5 8
The Eleventh Circuit, for example, concluded that two social workers
who complained about their caseload did so pursuant to their official
duties based on "the content, form, and context of [their] given statement[s], as revealed by the whole record."5 9 Using this rubric, the
court maintained that the form and content of the workers' com54 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.
55 Id. at 424.
56 Elizabeth Dale, Employee Speech & Management Rights: A CounterintuitiveReading
of Garcetti v. Ceballos, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 175, 209 (2008) (footnote
omitted).
57 See, e.g., Anthoine v. N. Cent. Cntys. Consortium, 605 F.3d 740, 749 (9th Cir.
2010) ("Statements do not lose First Amendment protection simply because they concern 'the subject matter of [the plaintiffs] employment."' (alteration in original)
(quoting Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528, 545 (9th Cir. 2006))); Rohrbough v. Univ. of
Colo. Hosp. Auth., 596 F.3d 741, 746 (10th Cir. 2010) ("[N]ot all speech 'about the
subject matter of an employee's work [is] necessarily made pursuant to the
employee's official duties."' (second alteration in original) (quoting BrammerHoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 492 F.3d 1192, 1204 (10th Cir. 2007))); Callahan v. Fermon, 526 F.3d 1040, 1044 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding neither location, audience, nor subject matter to be determinative); Foraker v. Chaffinch, 501 F.3d 231, 241
n.7 (3d Cir. 2007) ("[T]he fact that an employee speaks privately is not conclusive
. . ."), abrogated
. by Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488 (2011) (abrogating Foraker's distinction between the protections afforded by the Speech and Petition
Clauses of the First Amendment); D'Angelo v. Sch. Bd., 497 F.3d 1203, 1211 (11th
Cir. 2007) (discounting reliance on the location or the subject matter of the speech);
Williams v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 480 F.3d 689, 692 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam)
("[W]e do know that a formal job description is not dispositive, nor is speaking on the
subject matter of one's employment." (citation omitted) (citing Garcetti, 547 U.S. at
421, 424-25)).
58 Ogden v. Atterholt, 606 F.3d 355, 360 n.2 (7th Cir. 2010).
59 Boyce v. Andrew, 510 F.3d 1333, 1343 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (quoting
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983)).
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ments were "indicative of the fact that they intended to address only
matters connected with theirjobs."6 0 The Sixth Circuit likewise determined that the memo of a police officer protesting unit cutbacks
lacked First Amendment protection because "[t]he context of the
memo as a whole [was] best characterized as that of a disgruntled
employee upset that his professional suggestions were not followed as
they had been in the past."6 1 The First,62 Seventh,6 3 and Tenth Circuits64 offer further instances of this paradigm.
In implementing this overarching approach, one issue arises frequently: audience. Specifically, the process of speaking to one's
employer seems to indicate that an employee's speech falls within his
or her official duties. In Davis v. McKinney, 65 the Fifth Circuit denied
an audit manager a constitutional defense for an investigative report
that she had filed to her superiors because of the report's place within
the formal chain of command. 66 Though the court refused to adopt
an absolute rule for internal employee speech, it held that an
"employee's communications that relate to his own job function up
the chain of command, at least within his own department or division,
fall within his official duties and are not entitled to First Amendment
protection."6 7
60 Id.
61 Haynes v. City of Circleville, 474 F.3d 357, 364 (6th Cir. 2007); see also Weisbarth v. Geauga Park Dist., 499 F.3d 538, 545 (6th Cir. 2007) ("[T]he content of an
employee's speech-though not determinative-will inform the threshold inquiry
62 See Decotiis v. Whittemore, 635 F.3d 22, 32 (1st Cir. 2011) ("To determine
whether such speech was made pursuant to official responsibilities, the Court must
take a hard look at the context of the speech."); Mercado-Berrios v. Cancel-Alegrfa,
611 F.3d 18, 26 (1st Cir. 2010) ("The relevant inquiry under Garcetti thus has two basic
components-(1) what are the employee's official responsibilities? and (2) was the
speech at issue made pursuant to those responsibilities?-both of which are highly
context-sensitive."); Foley v. Town of Randolph, 598 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2010) ("More
critical to our analysis is the context of Foley's speech.").
63 SeeAbcarian v. McDonald, 617 F.3d 931, 937 (7th Cir. 2010) ("When determining whether a plaintiff spoke as an employee or as a citizen, we take a practical view of
the facts alleged in the complaint, looking to the employee's level of responsibility
and the context in which the statements were made."); Ogden, 606 F.3d at 360 n.2.
64 See Rohrbough v. Univ. of Colo. Hosp. Auth., 596 F.3d 741, 746 (10th Cir.
2010) ("[T]he Tenth Circuit has taken a case-by-case approach, looking both to the
content of the speech, as well as the employee's chosen audience, to determine
whether the speech is made pursuant to an employee's official duties.").
65 518 F.3d 304 (5th Cir. 2008).
66 See id. at 316.
67 Id. at 313 n.3.
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The Seventh Circuit has also employed the "chain of command"
test, principally in a case involving an Illinois State Police officer who
voiced his alarm about the safety of a firing range to a superior
officer.6 8 For the court, it was "clear that the complaints about lead
contamination that [the officer] made directly up the chain of command to his supervisors [were] not protected by the First Amendment," though it did not resolve whether the exact same speech made
through "a different, yet still entirely internal, channel" would find
shelter within the First Amendment.69 The Second,70 Third,7 ' Sixth,7 2
Tenth,7 3 Eleventh,74 and District of Columbia7 5 Circuits have rendered decisions using similar rationales.
68

See Bivens v. Trent, 591 F.3d 555, 557 (7th Cir. 2010); see also Tamayo v.

Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1091 (7th Cir. 2008) ("[O]ther courts have determined
that reports by government employees to their superiors concerning alleged wrongdoing in their government office were within the scope of their job duties, and, therefore, the employees were not speaking as private citizens."); Mills v. City of Evansville,
452 F.3d 646, 648 (7th Cir. 2006) ("Mills was on duty, in uniform, and engaged in
discussion with her superiors, all of whom had just emerged from Chief Gulledge's
briefing. She spoke in her capacity as a public employee contributing to the formation and execution of official policy.").
69 Bivens, 591 F.3d at 560.
70 See Huth v. Haslun, 598 F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that because an
employee relayed complaints to the head of her division, it had "no difficulty concluding that such speech was made not as a 'citizen' but, rather, pursuant to [her] official
duties").
71 SeeForaker v. Chaffinch, 501 F.3d 231, 241 (3d Cir. 2007) ("[T~he controlling
fact in the case at bar is that Price and Warren were expected, pursuant to their job
duties, to report problems concerning the operations at the range up the chain of
command."), abrogated by Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488 (2011)
(abrogating Foraker's distinction between the protections afforded by the Speech and
Petition Clauses of the First Amendment).
72 SeeFox v. Traverse City Area Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 605 F.3d 345, 350 (6th Cir.
2010) ("Of more immediate pertinence to Fox's claim is the Fifth Circuit's observation that '[ciases from other circuits are consistent in holding that when a public
employee raises complaints or concerns up the chain of command at his workplace
about his job duties, that speech is undertaken in the course of performing his job."'
(alteration in original) (quoting Davis, 518 F.3d at 313)); Haynes v. City of Circleville,
474 F.3d 357, 364 (6th Cir. 2007) ("The fact that Haynes communicated solely to his
superior also indicates that he was speaking 'in [his] capacity as a public employee
contributing to the formation and execution of official policy'.....
(alteration in
original) (quoting Mills, 452 F.3d at 648)).
73 See Rohrbough v. Univ. of Colo. Hosp. Auth., 596 F.3d 741, 747 (10th Cir.
2010) ("[S]peech directed at an individual or entity within an employee's chain of
command is often found to be pursuant to that employee's official duties ....
).
74 See Abdur-Rahman v. Walker, 567 F.3d 1278, 1284 (11th Cir. 2009) (noting
that the choice of public works inspectors to submit their concerns about county com-
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Conversely, a few circuits have reasoned that external speech may
fall outside Garcetti's reach if the employee's official duties did not
otherwise require such communications. At the same time that it
handed down its ruling in Davis excluding certain speech within the
chain of command from the ambit of the Constitution, the Fifth Circuit stated that if "a public employee takes his job concerns to persons
outside the work place in addition to raising them up the chain of
command at his workplace, then those external communications are
ordinarily not made as an employee, but as a citizen."76
The Ninth Circuit made a similar distinction for external communications in a case involving a correctional officer who objected to the
inability of officials to control the sexual impropriety of inmates." In
this case, the officer filed statements internally as well as to a state
senator and the California Inspector General.7 8 The court subsequently explained that the officer's grievances to the senator and the
Inspector General constituted protected speech because "[i]t was certainly not part of her official tasks to complain to the Senator or the
[Inspector General] about the state's failure to perform its duties
properly . . . . "
Yet, for the internal statements, the court either
reached the opposite result or did not enter a decision.80
The Tenth Circuit acted in like manner in Thomas v. City of
Blanchard,8 i placing a building inspector's threat to report illegal
behavior to the Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation outside the
realm of Garcetti.82 When the inspector "went beyond complaining to
his supervisors and instead threatened to report to the [Bureau], an
agency outside his chain of command, his speech ceased to be merely
pliance with the Clean Water Act to their supervisor suggested that they may have
believed such a course of action was within their own professional duties).
75 See Thompson v. District of Columbia, 530 F.3d 914, 916 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
("Ordinarily, employees who make recommendations to their supervisors on subjects
directly related to their jobs are carrying out their official duties . . . .").
76 Davis, 518 F.3d at 313; see also Charles v. Grief, 522 F.3d 508, 514 (5th Cir.
2008) (deciding that Garcettidid not apply to a lottery employee who sent allegations
of racial discrimination to the Texas Legislature because "[h]is decision to ignore the
normal chain of command in identifying problems with Commission operations [was]
a significant distinction").
77 See Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528, 532 (9th Cir. 2006).
78 See id. at 534-35.
79 Id. at 545.
80 See id. at 546.
81 548 F.3d 1317 (10th Cir. 2008).
82 See id. at 1325.
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'pursuant to his official duties' and became the speech of a concerned
citizen."8 3
This is not to say that the external/internal divide has become a
uniform standard among the circuits. Indeed, courts will not apply
the protections of the First Amendment where the employee's official
duties included speaking outside the chain of command. 84 For example, though the Sixth Circuit has indicated that the "chain of command" may suggest speech pursuant to an employee's official duties,8 5
the court has been careful to explain that "the determinative factor
...

[is] not where the person to whom the employee communicated

fit within the employer's chain of command, but rather whether the
employee communicated pursuant to his or her official duties."8 6 The
District of Columbia Circuit has also issued a decisive opinion on the
subject, maintaining that a "public employee speaks without First
Amendment protection when he reports conduct that interferes with
his job responsibilities, even if the report is made outside his chain of
command."8 7
2.

Formal Job Descriptions

To combat concerns that employers would construct overly broad
job descriptions in order to restrict their employees' ability to speak
without fear of reprisal, the Supreme Court discouraged any reliance
on these descriptions as a determinative factor.8 8 The courts have
83 Id.
84 See, e.g., Sarkar v. McCallin, 636 F.3d 572, 575-76 (10th Cir. 2011) (concluding
that a Colorado Community College System information officer's official duties
included speaking outside the chain of command as a representative of the System);
Anemone v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 629 F.3d 97, 116-17 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding that
an employee's referral of a corruption investigation to the District Attorney's office
deserved no First Amendment protection as it fell within his duties as Director of
Security); Bonn v. City of Omaha, 623 F.3d 587, 593 (8th Cir. 2010) (concluding that
an auditor's report criticizing the Omaha Police Department and subsequent discussion with media outlets about that report did not constitute protected speech because
her official duties included speaking to the media about her work as an auditor).
85 See Haynes v. City of Circleville, 474 F.3d 357, 364 (6th Cir. 2007) ("The fact
that Haynes communicated solely to his superior also indicates that he was speaking
'in [his] capacity as a public employee contributing to the formation and execution of
official policy' .

. . ."

(alteration in original) (quoting Mills v. City of Evansville, 452

F.3d 646, 648 (7th Cir. 2006))).
86 Weisbarth v. Geauga Park Dist., 499 F.3d 538, 545 (6th Cir. 2007).
87 Winder v. Erste, 566 F.3d 209, 215 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
88 See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424-25 (2006). As one commentator has
observed, this proscription may be a significant cause of the ongoing struggle circuit
courts have had in applying Garcetti. See Sarah F. Suma, Note, Uncertainty and Loss in
the Free Speech Rights of Public Employees UnderGarcetti v. Ceballos, 83 CHI.-KEr L. REV.
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thus not hesitated to reiterate the Supreme Court's position that such
descriptions are neither necessary nor sufficient for reaching a
conclusion.8 9
Nevertheless, a few circuits have used formal job descriptions
extensively as part of their contextual analysis, putting plaintiffs "on
notice that their own descriptions of their jobs, whether within or
outside of the litigation, will inform the court about whether the
speech was within their official responsibilities."9 0 In one instance,
the Ninth Circuit looked to an engineer's training manual to clarify
the scope of his job duties.9 1 Although the manual was not dispositive, it was informative enough to aid the court in holding that the
engineer's complaints about managerial misconduct fell outside these
duties. 92 The Seventh Circuit similarly considered a county jail's General Orders in ruling that the protests by guards over the maltreatment of prisoners were not covered by the First Amendment because
the Orders required the exposure of such misconduct.9 3 And the
369, 380 (2008) ("One reason that courts will struggle with finding the scope of an
employee's job duties is that the most concrete, simple indicators are not determinative of a job duty . . . that job descriptions are neither necessary nor sufficient to
establish ajob duty.").
89 See Abdur-Rahman v. Walker, 567 F.3d 1278, 1283 (11th Cir. 2009) ("Formal
job descriptions do not control the inquiry . . . ."); Chaklos v. Stevens, 560 F.3d 705,
712 (7th Cir. 2009); Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179, 185 (3d Cir. 2009); Thomas v.
City of Blanchard, 548 F.3d 1317, 1323 (10th Cir. 2008) ("[A] court cannot simply
read off an employee's duties from ajob description. . . ."); Houskins v. Sheahan, 549
F.3d 480, 490 (7th Cir. 2008) ("Determining the official duties of a public employee
... is not limited to the formal job description." (citing Vose v. Kliment, 506 F.3d 565,
569 (7th Cir. 2007))); Williams v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 480 F.3d 689, 692 (5th Cir.
2007) (per curiam) ("[W]e do know that a formal job description is not dispositive
.... ." (citing Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424-25)); McGee v. Pub. Water Supply, Dist. No. 2,
471 F.3d 918, 921 (8th Cir. 2006) ("The Court noted that determining the scope of an
employee's official duties for these purposes is a practical inquiry that focuses on 'the
duties an employee actually is expected to perform,' rather than his formal job
description." (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424-25)).
90 Erin Daly, Garcetti in Delaware:New Limits on PublicEmployees' Speech, 11 DEL. L.
REV. 23, 32 (2009).
91 See Marable v. Nitchman, 511 F.3d 924, 933 (9th Cir. 2007).
92 See id.
93 See Fairley v. Andrews, 578 F.3d 518, 522 (7th Cir. 2009); see also Hernandez v.
Cook Cnty. Sheriff's Office, 634 F.3d 906, 915 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that employees of the Sheriff's Office lacked a First Amendment claim for their complaints about
prison conditions because those complaints were filed pursuant to the Office's General Orders); Callahan v. Fermon, 526 F.3d 1040, 1045 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that
an Illinois State Police officer's comments on the misconduct of fellow officers were
not protected under the First Amendment partly because Illinois State Police rules
required all officers to report misconduct).
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Tenth Circuit did the same in the case of a transplant coordinator
who cried foul over her hospital's continuing exercise of substandard
care, finding no application of the First Amendment for the statements because hospital policies instructed employees to report
instances of unsafe conduct.9 4
3.

The "Existence" Principle

Another point of reference from Garcetti that circuits use in tandem with each other follows from the Supreme Court's observation
that speech pursuant to official duties "owes its existence to a public
employee's professional responsibilities." 9 5 Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit in Fox v. Traverse City Area Public Schools Board of Education96 ruled
that a special education teacher's formal job duties included her complaint about her class size because it "'owe [d] its existence to' her
responsibilities as a special education teacher."9 7 Comparably, the
Seventh Circuit reached the same constitutional result for a social
worker who reported a fight she had with a correctional officer.9 8 As
explained by the court, because the worker's internal report owed its
existence to her employment, it would require "mental gymnastics" to
claim that it was not made pursuant to her official duties.9 9 Other
courts using this language as a template include the Eighth, 0 0
Ninth,10 Eleventh,10 2 and District of Columbia Circuits.1 03
94 See Rohrbough v. Univ. of Colo. Hosp. Auth., 596 F.3d 741, 748 (10th Cir.
2010).
95 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).
96 605 F.3d 345 (6th Cir. 2010).
97 Id. at 349 (quoting Weisbarth v. Geauga Park Dist., 499 F.3d 538, 544 (6th Cir.
2007)); see also Weisbarth, 499 F.3d at 545 (6th Cir. 2007) ("Moreover, Weisbarth's
speech indisputably 'owes its existence to [her] professional responsibilities,' as did
Garcetti's." (alteration in original) (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421)).
98 See Houskins v. Sheahan, 549 F.3d 480, 483 (7th Cir. 2008).
99 Id. at 491; see also Callahan v. Fermon, 526 F.3d 1040, 1044 (7th Cir. 2008)
("The controlling factor in the Garcetti inquiry is whether the speech 'owes its existence to a public employee's professional responsibilities.'" (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S.
at 421)).
100 See Bradley v. James, 479 F.3d 536, 538 (8th Cir. 2007); McGee v. Pub. Water
Supply, Dist. No. 2, 471 F.3d 918, 921 (8th Cir. 2006) ("A public employee's speech is
not protected by the First Amendment if it 'owes its existence' to his professional
responsibilities." (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421)).
101 See Anthoine v. N. Cent. Cntys. Consortium, 605 F.3d 740, 749 (9th Cir. 2010);
Huppert v. City of Pittsburg, 574 F.3d 696, 704 (9th Cir. 2009).
102 See Abdur-Rahman v. Walker, 567 F.3d 1278, 1283 (11th Cir. 2009) ("The
Court defined speech made pursuant to an employee's job duties as 'speech that owes
its existence to a public employee's professional responsibilities,' and a product that
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Proceeding from this "existence" principle, many circuits have
evaluated the context of the speech at issue in light of its potential for
an applicable citizen equivalent. As the Eleventh Circuit has pointed
out, "Speech that owes its existence to the official duties of public
employees is not citizen speech . . .. In that context, 'tt]here is no
relevant analogue to speech by citizens who are not government
4
employees,' and the speech is unprotected."l 0 Thus, the First Circuit
0 5 judged a fire chiefs statements to the
in Foley v. Town of Randolph'
media, which included critical remarks on budgetary and staffing
issues, to be part of his official duties. 106 Because the chief spoke
while on duty, in uniform, and at the scene of a fire, he would have
been perceived as bearing the imprimatur of the fire department for
07
which there was no relevant citizen analogue.
Similarly, the Second Circuit supported the dismissal of a claim
brought by a grade school teacher who filed a union complaint largely
on the basis that the teacher's "speech ultimately took the form of an
employee grievance, for which there [was] no relevant citizen analogue."' 0 8 Though not determinative, it was highly indicative that the
teacher, "[r] ather than voicing his grievance through channels available to citizens generally, . . . made an internal communication pursu-

ant to an existing dispute-resolution policy established by his
employer, the Board of Education."1 09 More recently, the court in
Jackler v. Byrne' 10 declined to apply Garcetti to a probationary officer's
refusal to withdraw a truthful report and file a false one in its place
because that "refusal to comply with orders .

.

. [had] a clear civilian

As the court stated, "the First Amendment protects the
analogue."'
rights of a citizen to refuse to retract a report to the police that he
'the employer itself has commissioned or created."' (citations omitted) (quoting
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421, 422)).
103 See Winder v. Erste, 566 F.3d 209, 215 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
104 Abdur-Rahman, 567 F.3d at 1285-86 (alteration in original) (citation omitted)
(quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424).
105 598 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2010).
106 See id. at 7.
107

See id. at 7-8; see also Decotiis v. Whittemore, 635 F.3d 22, 34 (1st Cir. 2011)

(concluding that Garcettimight not reach the speech of a Child Development Services
employee who voiced concerns about her employer's compliance with state regulations because "her speech appear [ed] to have been sufficiently analogous to the
speech of other citizens in the community troubled by the new regulation and
policy").
108 Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ., 593 F.3d 196, 203 (2d Cir. 2010).
109 Id. at 204.
110 No. 10-0859-cv, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 (2d Cir. July 22, 2011).
111 See id. at *39.
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believes is true, to refuse to make a statement that he believes is false,
and to refuse to engage in unlawful conduct by filing a false report
with the police."11 2 The Fifth,1 13 Sixth, 114 Seventh,11 5 Ninth,1 16
Tenth,1 17 and Eleventh Circuits' 18 have all employed this search for
appropriate citizen parallels as well. Yet exclusive reliance on the citizen analogue approach has also drawn censure from the District of
Columbia Circuit. Criticizing the Second Circuit's analysis in Jackleras
"get[ting] Garcetti backwards," the court stressed that "[t]he critical
question under Garcettiis not whether the speech at issue has a civilian
analogue, but whether it was performed 'pursuant to . . . official

duties."' 1 9 Any "test that allows a First Amendment retaliation claim to
proceed whenever the government employee can identify a civilian
analogue for his speech is about as useful as a mosquito net made of
chicken wire: All official speech, viewed at a sufficient level of abstraction, has a civilian analogue." 2 0

112 Id. at *38-39.
113 See Nixon v. City of Houston, 511 F.3d 494, 498 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that a
police officer's criticisms of the Houston Police Department made to the media were
not protected by the First Amendment because there was no relevant citizen analogue
for the speech made on duty, in uniform, and at the scene of an accident).
114 See Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ., 624 F.3d 332, 340-41 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that a teacher's attempt to control her class's curriculum did not constitute protected speech because "'[n]o relevant analogue' exist[ed] between her in-class
curricular speech and speech by private citizens" (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547
U.S. 410, 424 (2006))).
115 See Houskins v. Sheahan, 549 F.3d 480, 491 (7th Cir. 2008) (distinguishing an
employee's unprotected internal report of a fight from the police report she filed
because her "statements to the police were not made pursuant to her job, as the
report was not generated in the normal course of her duties and most likely was similar to reports filed by citizens every day").
116 See Huppert v. City of Pittsburg, 574 F.3d 696, 704 (9th Cir. 2009) ("Speech
which has 'no official significance' and bears 'similarities to [actions taken] by numerous citizens everyday' falls outside the ambit of an employee's job duties and would be
protected by the First Amendment." (alteration in original) (quoting Garcetti, 547
U.S. at 422)).
117 See Rohrbough v. Univ. of Colo. Hosp. Auth., 596 F.3d 741, 746 (10th Cir.
2010).
118 See Abdur-Rahman v. Walker, 567 F.3d 1278, 1285-86 (11th Cir. 2009); Boyce
v. Andrew, 510 F.3d 1333, 1345 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
119 Bowie v. Maddox, No. 08-5111, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18158, at *8 (D.C. Cir.
Aug. 31, 2011) (quoting Garcetti,547 U.S. at 421).
120 Id. at *8.
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Unique Circuit Approaches

Although circuit opinions applying Garcettiare rife with citations
to the Supreme Court's language, a few courts have put their own
twists on the analysis. Evaluated as a whole, these novel approaches

do not seem to stray too far from Garcetti's mandate. However, their
significance lies in their demonstration of how some courts are currently translating the hazy inquiry set out by the Supreme Court into a
workable methodology.
The Fifth Circuit has tailored its own approach by actually defining "official duties," identifying them as those "activities undertaken in
122
the course of performing one's job."121 In Nixon v. City of Houston,
the court reviewed the case of a police officer who made disparaging
remarks about his department to the media while on duty and in uniform.123 The court determined that the officer's statements lacked a
constitutional safeguard because they were made "pursuant to his offi1 24 In the
cial duties and during the course of performing his job."
same manner, the court held in Williams v. Dallas Independent School
District125 that a high school athletic director's memorandum questioning the school's handling of funds was "made in the course of
performing his employment" because he was responsible for consult126 As a result, the
ing with his superiors about his office's budget.
director spoke pursuant to his official duties. 127
Citing language in the Fifth Circuit, the Third Circuit formulated
its own characterization of the Garcetti inquiry by concluding that
"speech might be considered part of [a public employee's] official
duties if it relates to 'special knowledge' or 'experience' acquired
through his job." 2 8 For example, the court decided that a university
professor's assistance of a student was not protected freedom of association because his "special knowledge of, and experience with, the
121

Williams v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 480 F.3d 689, 693 (5th Cir. 2007) (per

curiam).

122
123
124

511 F.3d 494 (5th Cir. 2007).
See id. at 496-97.
Id. at 498.

125

480 F.3d 689 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).

126 Id. at 694.
127 See id.
128 Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179, 185 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Foraker v. Chaffinch, 501 F.3d 231, 240 (3d Cir. 2007), abrogatedby Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri,
131 S. Ct. 2488 (2011) (abrogating Forake's distinction between the protections
afforded by the Speech and Petition Clauses of the First Amendment)). Forakerwas in
turn quoting language from Williams, 480 F.3d at 694. Recently, the First Circuit has
also indicated its willingness to use the "special knowledge" paradigm, citing Williams
in the process. See Decotiis v. Whittemore, 635 F.3d 22, 34 (1st Cir. 2011).
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[university's] disciplinary code .. . made him defacto advisor to all ...
students with disciplinary problems."' 2 9 Likewise, in Foraker v. Chaffinch,13 0 the court declined to extend the First Amendment to Delaware State Police officers who exposed deteriorating conditions at a
firing range.'13 The officers' "special knowledge and experience"
with the range "demonstrated their responsibility for ensuring its
functionality by reporting problems to their superiors."13 2
As the Ninth Circuit has opined, "[s]tatements are made in the
speaker's capacity as citizen if the speaker had no official duty to make
the questioned statements, or if the speech was not the product of
performing the tasks the employee was paid to perform." 3 3 Drawn
from language in two previous opinions,' 3 4 the court's approach precludes constitutional protection from those statements either made
directly pursuant to official duties or resulting from tasks closely intertwined with them. However, the Ninth Circuit has not had much
occasion to assess this test's viability. In two cases where it has come
up, the court heard summary judgment appeals and did not have a
chance to fully implement an examination of the speech in
question. 3 5
The Tenth Circuit has espoused a number of adaptations of
Garcetti, but its most recent approach parallels the Ninth Circuit's by
focusing the classification on "whether the speech activity 'stemmed
from and [was of] the type . . . that [the employee] was paid to

do."" 3 6 Indeed, the court initially stepped in this direction in one of
its first post-Garcetti cases, Green v. Board of County Commissioners,'3 7
129 Gorum, 561 F.3d at 186 (internal quotation marks omitted).
130 501 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 2007), abrogatedby Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131
S. Ct. 2488 (2011) (abrogating Foraker's distinction between the protections afforded
by the Speech and Petition Clauses of the First Amendment).
131 See id. at 240.
132 Id.
133 See Anthoine v. N. Cent. Cntys. Consortium, 605 F.3d 740, 749 (9th Cir. 2010)
(quoting Eng v. Cooley, 552 F.3d 1062, 1071 (9th Cir. 2009)).
134 In Posey v. Lake Pend Oreille Sch. Dist. No. 84, 546 F.3d 1121, 1127 n.2 (9th Cir.
2008), the court synthesized the opinions of two prior cases, holding that "statements
are made in the speaker's capacity as citizen if the speaker 'had no official duty' to
make the questioned statements, or if the speech was not the product of 'perform[ing] the tasks [the employee] was paid to perform."' Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Marable v. Nitchman, 511 F.3d 924, 932-33 (9th
Cir. 2007), and Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528, 544 (9th Cir. 2006)).
135 See Anthoine, 605 F.3d at 750; Eng, 552 F.3d at 1073.
136 Rohrbough v. Univ. of Colo. Hosp. Auth., 596 F.3d 741, 746 (10th Cir. 2010)
(alterations in original) (quoting Green v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 472 F.3d 794, 801
(10th Cir. 2007)).
137 472 F.3d 794 (10th Cir. 2007).
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which involved a drug-lab technician who raised concerns about her
facility's testing policies. "[E]ven if not explicitly required as part of
her day-to-day job responsibilities," the technician's "activities
stemmed from and were the type of activities that she was paid to do"
and thus fell within her official duties.1 38
The court subsequently altered the language a few months later
' stating that an
in Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Academy, 39
the "employee
when
duties
to
official
employee speaks pursuant
engages in speech during the course of performing an official duty
and the speech reasonably contributes to or facilitates the employee's
performance of the official duty."14 0 The court also took notice that
Garcetti "made clear that speech relating to tasks within an employee's
uncontested employment responsibilities is not protected from regulation."1 4 1 Although the Brammer-Hoelterversion has since appeared in
Tenth Circuit case law,142 the court recently reasserted the Green variant when it affirmed that a transplant coordinator's complaints about
43
Her
her hospital's practices were not protected statements.1
"reporting about the conditions affecting her ability to fulfill her
duties as Transplant Coordinator at the Hospital undoubtedly was an
activity that 'stemmed from and [was of] the type . . . that she was paid
44

to do.' "1
The Seventh Circuit has taken a somewhat comprehensive view of
the scope of employment, expanding the analysis to look beyond
"core job functions."' 4 5 Noting that a focus on these functions is "too
narrow after Garcetti,which asked only whether an 'employee's expressions [were] made pursuant to official responsibilities,' "146 the court
has applied this viewpoint to rebuff the retaliation claim of a police
officer who complained about the misbehavior of officers in another
138 Id. at 800-01.
139 492 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2007).
140 Id. at 1203. The court in Brammer-Hoelterinterpreted Green as stating that "that
speech is made pursuant to official duties if it is generally consistent with 'the type of
activities [the employee] was paid to do.'" Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Green,
472 F.3d at 801).
141 Id.
142 See Thomas v. City of Blanchard, 548 F.3d 1317, 1324 (10th Cir. 2008).
143 See Rohrbough v. Univ. of Colo. Hosp. Auth., 596 F.3d 741, 748 (10th Cir.
2010).
144 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Green, 472 F.3d at 801).
145 See, e.g., Spiegla v. Hull, 481 F.3d 961, 966 (7th Cir. 2007) (stating that a "focus
on 'core' job functions is too narrow").
146 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424
(2006)).

860o

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 87:2

unit. 1 4 7 Though the officer "may have gone above and beyond his

routine duties by investigating and reporting suspected misconduct in
another police unit," he commented on a matter that could have
affected his own unit and therefore spoke pursuant to his official
duties."' 8 In contrast to the Ninth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit has
had some time to develop this rubric, using it to bar the First Amendment from applying to a nurse who wrote a memorandum about
unpleasant encounters with hospital personnel,1 4 9 a professor who
objected to his university's use of grant funds, 15 0 and a state insurance
employee who criticized his superior's management style.11
III.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE "SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT" INQUIRY AND
THE FUTURE OF GARCETITI

As the circuits entrench themselves more firmly in their
approaches to the application of Garcetti, their opinions seem to indicate a comprehensive reading of what constitutes speech made pursuant to official duties. This Part addresses this expansive interpretation
of Garcettiand concludes with an assessment of the future implications
for public employee speech. It argues that the law should continue to
embrace a defined contextual approach for determining the scope of
employment, but should return to a modified Pickering/ Connick balancing standard for applying the First Amendment to public employees who speak pursuant to their official duties.
A.

Expansive Views of Scope of Employment

Due to Garcetti's lack of a distinct standard for measuring the
scope of employment, it is impossible to positively assert that any individual circuit's position on the range of official duties is too broad or
too narrow according to the Supreme Court's mandate. However, in
light of the various methods adopted by the circuits, some legal academics like Professor Elizabeth Dale have insisted that the courts have
"demonstrate [d] a tendency to read [ Garcetti] as a broad restriction
on [a] public employee's First Amendment rights."' 5 2
Certain cases seem to bear this out, especially where the circuits
reach those activities considered to be outside an employee's conventional duties. Because the majority in Garcettifeared employers creat147

See Vose v. Kliment, 506 F.3d 565, 570 (7th Cir. 2007).

148

Id.

149

See Davis v. Cook Cnty., 534 F.3d 650, 653 (7th Cir. 2008).

150
151
152

See Renken v. Gregory, 541 F.3d 769, 773-74 (7th Cir. 2008).
See Ogden v. Atterholt, 606 F.3d 355, 360 n.2 (7th Cir. 2010).
Dale, supra note 56, at 207.
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ing broad job descriptions in order to cover their legal bases, the
Court rejected any binding relationship between such descriptions
and what constitutes official duties.'15 Using this absence of a determinative correlation, the circuit courts have occasionally gone beyond
formal job descriptions in classifying the scope of employment. In the
Fifth Circuit's Nixon decision, the court did not find it dispositive that
"[the officer's] statement was unauthorized by [the department] and
54
that speaking to the press was not part of his regular job duties."1
55
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit in Phillips v. City of Dawsonville'
deemed a city clerk's attempts to expose mayoral misconduct, including allegations of misuse of city property, misappropriation of funds,
and sexual harassment, to be within the confines of her official duties,
though they were not clearly part of her recognized job responsibilities. 15 6 Proceeding from the fact that the clerk's formally prescribed
tasks included "keeping the Mayor and the Council informed of the
financial condition of the city," the court concluded that the allegations fit within her official duties because they all touched "on a mis57
use of City resources . . . or on potential city liability or both."'
Consequently, "[a]lthough her enumerated duties did not specify
reporting misconduct by the Mayor, it was within her official duties to
inquire about and make statements on the potentially inappropriate
use of the City resources."15 8 The Second,15 9 Third,160 Sixth,161 Sev153 See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424-25 (2006).
154 Nixon v. City of Houston, 511 F.3d 494, 498-99 (5th Cir. 2007). For another
example in the Fifth Circuit, see Williams v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 480 F.3d 689, 694
(5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) ("Simply because Williams wrote memoranda, which
were not demanded of him, does not mean he was not acting within the course of
performing his job.").
155 499 F.3d 1239 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
156 See id. at 1243.
157 Id. at 1242.
158 Id.
159 See Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ., 593 F.3d 196, 203 (2d Cir. 2010) ("[S]peech can
be 'pursuant to' a public employee's official job duties even though it is not required
by, or included in, the employee's job description, or in response to a request by the
employer.").
160 SeeForakerv. Chaffinch, 501 F.3d 231, 242 (3d Cir. 2007) ("[T]he fact that [an
officer] may have exceeded the expectations of his formal job description as a firearms instructor [did] not mean that they were not within the scope of his duties."),
abrogated by Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488 (2011) (abrogating
Foraker's distinction between the protections afforded by the Speech and Petition
Clauses of the First Amendment).
161 See Fox v. Traverse City Area Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 605 F.3d 345, 348 (6th Cir.
2010) ("Speech by a public employee made pursuant to ad hoc or defacto duties not
appearing in any written job description is nevertheless not protected if it 'owes its
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enth,16 2 Ninth,16 3 and Tenth Circuits1 64 have all also indicated that
the inquiry extends to activities outside a public employee's formal job
responsibilities.
This interpretation raises an interesting question. In Garcetti, the
majority repudiated a conclusive link between formal job descriptions
and official duties in response to the suggestion that "employers
[could] restrict employees' rights by creating excessively broad job
descriptions."165 The majority thus was permitting a court to recognize that an employee's statement, although made in the course of
performing an activity listed on his or her job description, was not
part of his or her official duties. The Court, at least explicitly, did not
speak to a move in the other direction-namely that because formal
job descriptions are no longer determinative, courts can now define
official duties to include activities beyond those descriptions. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to presume that a "practical" evaluation of a public employee's official responsibilities may from time to time include
those external activities. Regardless, it is relatively clear at present
that the circuits have interpreted Garcetti to permit such an examination. The pertinent issue now concerns how far courts are going to
go. Currently, the circuits are occasionally embracing sizeable
amounts of speech within the purview of official duties.
A slight expansion to the scope of employment may also be evident in some of the unique approaches exhibited by certain courts of
appeals.' 6 6 The Fifth Circuit in Williams used its particular delineation of official duties, "activities undertaken in the course of performexistence to [the speaker's] professional responsibilities.'" (alteration in original)
(quoting Weisbarth v. Geauga Park Dist., 499 F.3d 538, 544 (6th Cir. 2007))).
162 See Hernandez v. Cook Cnty. Sheriffs Office, 634 F.3d 906, 915 n.11 (7th Cir.
2011) ("Garcetti clarified that 'official duties' encompass even unusual communications outside an employee's 'core' job functions. Thus, since Spiegla I, the definition
of non-protected speech has been broadened." (citations omitted) (citing Spiegla v.
Hull, 481 F.3d 961, 966 (7th Cir. 2007))).
163 See Huppert v. City of Pittsburg, 574 F.3d 696, 704 (9th Cir. 2009) ("Our
inquiry should be practical and look beyond the job description to the duties the
employee actually performs.").
164 See Rohrbough v. Univ. of Colo. Hosp. Auth., 596 F.3d 741, 747 (10th Cir.
2010) ("In addition, the court has not foreclosed unauthorized speech or speech 'not
explicitly required as part of [an employee's] day-to-day job' from being within the
scope of that employee's official duties." (alteration in original) (quoting Green v. Bd.
of Cnty. Comrh'rs, 472 F.3d 794, 800-01 (10th Cir. 2007))); Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin
Peaks Charter Acad., 492 F.3d 1192, 1203 (10th Cir. 2007) (noting that speech may
not be protected even if it "concerns an unusual aspect of an employee's job that is
not part of his everyday functions").
165 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424 (2006).
166 See supra Part II.B.
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ing one's job,"16 7 to bar the First Amendment from applying to the
athletic director's memorandum, even though it admittedly was not
demanded of him.1 68 In fact, the Second Circuit cited this decision as
support for the proposition that "speech can be 'pursuant to' a public
employee's official job duties even though it is not required by, or
included in, the employee's job description, or in response to a
request by the employer."1 69 In the Third Circuit's treatment of
Foraker,"the fact that [an officer] may have exceeded the expectations
of his formal job description as a firearms instructor [did] not mean
that they were not within the scope of his duties."1 76 Rather, the
officer's "special knowledge and experience .

.

. demonstrated [his]

responsibility for ensuring [the firing range's] functionality by reporting problems to their superiors."17 1
The evolution of the Tenth Circuit's own methodology is a lucid
reflection of this phenomenon. The court has insisted in the past that
an employee's speech may be constitutionally defenseless "even if it
deals with activities that the employee is not expressly required to perform."1 72 Its initial pronouncement in Green, that the inquiry should
focus on whether the speech "activities stemmed from and were the
type of activities that [the employee] was paid to do,"1 73 allowed the
court to restrict speech that had a relation to those tasks that the
employee was paid to do. By "denying First Amendment protection
for employees' speech that either fell within their portfolio of duties or
was generally consistent with the type of duties they were hired to do,"
the Tenth Circuit in Green "interpreted Garcetti's 'speech pursuant to
official duties' bar broadly." 174
Qualifying this approach in Brammer-Hoelter, the court narrowed
its view by requiring that the speech "reasonably contribute [ ] to or
facilitate [ ]" an official duty for it to lose the cover of the First Amend167 Williams v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 480 F.3d 689, 693 (5th Cir. 2007) (per
curiam).
168 See id. at 694.
169 Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ., 593 F.3d 196, 203 (2d Cir. 2010).
170 Foraker v. Chaffinch, 501 F.3d 231, 242 (3d Cir. 2007), abrogatedby Borough of
Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488 (2011) (abrogating Foraker's distinction between
the protections afforded by the Speech and Petition Clauses of the First
Amendment).
171 Id. at 240.
172 Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 492 F.3d 1192, 1203 (10th Cir.
2007).
173 Green v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 472 F.3d 794, 800-01 (10th Cir. 2007).
174 Raj Chohan, Note, Tenth Circuit Interpretationsof Garcetti: Limits on FirstAmendment Protections for Whistle-Blowers, 85 DENV. U. L. REv. 573, 584 (2008) (footnotes
omitted).
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ment, as opposed to merely stemming from that duty.1 75 Moreover,
the case's "notion of 'uncontested employment responsibilities' seems
to allow more gray-area speech to survive the Garcetti razor than
Green's 'generally consistent with[ ]' . . . analysis."17 6 Yet, if Garcetti
instructs courts to adhere strictly to official duties, and not stray to
speech that reasonably contributes to or facilitates them, then Brammer-Hoelter"nevertheless remains broader than the specific application
used" by the Supreme Court. 177 Moreover, the recent reappearance
of Green's language in the court's case law may signify the recurrence
of a more expansive view of the scope of employment within the
Tenth Circuit. 178
B.

The Future of Garcetti

As the courts of appeals began to construct their own readings of
what Garcettirequired, the ensuing debate revealed a number of problematic aspects of Garcetti's future in the circuits. This section
addresses defenses and criticisms of Garcetti and its ongoing treatment
by the circuits. Specifically, there are three main points of contention: (1) the proper balance between the government's efficiency
interest as an employer and the public interest in the speech of public
employees; (2) the extent to which Garcetti's holding, as applied by
the circuits, is consistent with its formalist foundations; and (3) the
degree to which Garcetti and its subsequent applications encourage a
"perverse incentive" for public employees to speak outside the chain
of command where their speech is more likely to find constitutional
protection. Following this discussion, the section will conclude with a
proposed alternative to Garcetti in the form of a balancing standard
similar to the Court's pre- Garcetti public employee speech
jurisprudence.
1. A Defense of Garcetti
The first aspect of the debate over the circuits' execution of
Garcetti revolves around the fact that Garcetti"represents the Supreme
175 Brammer-Hoelter,492 F.3d at 1203.
176 Chohan, supra note 174, at 586.
177 Id. at 587.
178 See Rohrbough v. Univ. of Colo. Hosp. Auth., 596 F.3d 741, 746 (10th Cir.
2010) (quoting Green, 472 F.3d at 801); see also Sarkar v. McCallin, 636 F.3d 572, 576
(10th Cir. 2011) ("It is clear from the record that all of these individuals ... spoke
with Plaintiff in his capacity as CCCS chief information officer, not as a private citizen,
and that their discussions stemmed from Plaintiffs official duties to oversee the contract
with SunGard . . . ." (emphasis added)).
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Court's effort to balance two vital, yet competitive, interests: the government employer's interest in promoting the efficient operation of
public services and the shared interest of the public employee and the
community at large in preserving the value of unfettered speech." 179
One explanation for why the Court balanced in favor of the government's interest as an employer stems from the theory that the First
Amendment's purpose in protecting whistleblowers is really a "commitment to free speech as a means of achieving political accountability" against public management. 8 0
From the outset, strict regulation of employee speech is arguably
necessary to provide maximum governmental efficiency. As explained
by Professor Robert C. Post, "managerial domains" deserve a special
place within the First Amendment universe because their constitutional significance lies in their "instrumental rationality, a value that
conceptualizes persons as means to an end rather than as autonomous
agents." 18 1 This in turn reveals an inherent paradox: these domains
must organize themselves in a manner contrary to democratic principles, imposing ends upon employees so "that [the] democratic state
can actually achieve objectives that have been democratically agreed
upon."18 2 It is for this reason that the government must have the ability to control speech within managerial domains, including the power
to "regulate the speech of government employees so as to promote
'the efficiency of the public services [the government] performs
183
through its employees.'"
In turn, this type of power is required to ensure that public
employers are held justly accountable. Unless public offices have
some leeway in controlling their employees' speech, it becomes
increasingly difficult for them to efficiently attain other legitimate
objectives.1 8 4 Managerial control over employee speech is then
"essential" if public employers are to be held politically responsible by
the electorate.' 8 5 If, on the other hand, all speech claims were to be
sorted out by the judiciary, it would prevent public officials from having any effective control over their offices, thereby "seriously compro179 Smith, supra note 9, at 290.
180 Lawrence Rosenthal, The EmergingFirstAmendment Law of ManagerialPrerogative,
77 FoRDHAM L. REv. 33, 38, 60 (2008).
181 Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 164 (1996).
182 Id.
183 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142
(1983)).
184 See Rosenthal, supra note 180, at 88.
185 See id. at 38, 48.
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mis[ing] the First Amendment's" goal of ensuring effective political
accountability.18 6
Professor Dale takes a more limited view of this managerial prerogative. Agreeing that the opinion should be viewed through the
lens of managerial rights, she argues that the Court recognized the
right of employers to have the "discretion to define their mission,
tasks, and work product."' 8 7 Yet, although the majority embedded the
notion that government agencies can silence certain types of
employee speech, she also maintains that the Court implicitly delineated the bounds of managerial rights in three ways: by internal
restraints such as custom or collective bargaining agreements, by
external restraints in the form of law, and by public policy.' 88 Accordingly, there can be no freedom of speech where a public employer has
managerial control over the employee's speech. But this prerogative
may be limited by the Constitution, laws, contracts, or public policy.18 9
Structured in this way, Dale believes Garcetti "should increase the protections for public employees in the long run."190
The second point in the debate focuses on the characterization of
Garcetti as a "hallmark of formalism" in its choice of an "absolute prophylactic rule" restricting public employee speech pursuant to official
duties, as opposed to a balancing standard like that of the Pickeing/
Connick ilk.1 9' The Court based its preference for a rule on principles
of federalism and the separation of powers.19 2 Professor Lawrence
Rosenthal defends this decision on the grounds that a balancing standard would induce uncertain litigation and thus create a "chilling
effect on employees and supervisors alike."s9 3 Supervisors inevitably
will have to make official decisions based on anticipated litigation.
Under a balancing standard, the resulting unpredictability will lead
employers and employees to err on the silent side. More fundamentally, Rosenthal contends that Garcetti rejected a balancing standard
for the simple reason that there is nothing to balance on the
employee's end.194 An employee who is required to speak pursuant to
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
1191.
193
194

See id. at 38.
Dale, supra note 56, at 213.
See id. at 214.
See id. at 218.
Id. at 217.
Rhodes, supra note 6, at 1191-92.
See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 423 (2006); Rhodes, supra note 6, at
Rosenthal, supra note 180, at 49.
See id.
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his or her official duties has no "liberty" interest; the speech is supposed to be carried out according to management's wishes."'
Finally, there is an accountability argument to be made in
response to those critics who argue that Garcetti creates a "perverse
incentive" to speak outside the chain of command. According to
detractors, Garcetti indirectly funnels public employees' speech into
the public domain, where courts are more likely to confer First
Amendment safeguards, instead of following traditional internal complaint procedures.19 6 This creates efficiency concerns as public
employees seek to invite public scrutiny of governmental activities
rather than contain their complaints within the proper internal channels where they can be dealt with more expediently. However, Garcetti
proponents point to the fact that employees speaking externally are,
by definition, exposing misconduct to the general public.197 As a
result, they are enabling the "the process of political accountability to
function" and therefore deserve the shelter of the Constitution. 9 8 In
contrast, there is not much reason to apply the First Amendment to
internal duty-related reports that inherently "contribute little to public discussion and debate."19 9
2.

Criticisms of the Garcetti Analysis

Though it is beyond question that unqualified constitutional coverage of public employee speech would greatly disrupt the efficient
performance of government agencies and offices, perhaps the
Supreme Court went too far in swinging the pendulum in the other
direction. As noted by justice Souter and other scholars, the absolute
nature of Garcetti's ruling ignores the "possibility that an employee
may be speaking both as an employee and as a private citizen on matters of public concern." 200 Contrary to the theory of accountability, a
number of commentators have asserted that government speech is
insulated from scrutiny "precisely because of its instrumental value to
the public as listeners." 20 1 In supporting the managerial interest, the
195 See id.
196 See, e.g., Chohan, supra note 174, at 594 ("Ironically, the Garcetti rule appears
to have created a perverse incentive that encourages government employees to take
their problems first to the media, or any authority outside of the employee's immediate chain of command.").
197 See Rosenthal, supra note 180, at 59-60.
198 Id.
199 Id.
200 Chohan, supra note 174, at 591.
201 Helen Norton, Government Workers and Government Speech, 7 FIRST AMENDMENT
L. REv. 75, 86 (2008).
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Court placed "all the weight on the side of the employer's interest in
controlling employee speech

..

. and [took] away from the employee's

right to speak out about issues of public concern, and from society's
right to know what the government is doing."2 02 In fact, there is much
to be said for the argument that, because public employees have intimate knowledge of their own duties, there is an enhanced value in
allowing them to contribute to the "marketplace" of ideas by speaking
on matters of public concern related to theirjobs. It is this underlying
public value that necessitates an approach that takes into account
both sides of the scale.
Moreover, though the majority in Garcetti may have intended a
categorical approach, the Court's endorsement of a "practical"
inquiry undercut the very purpose of having a formalistic rule. 2 0 3
Because of the "almost limitless circumstances in which [public
employee speech cases] arise," they "defy simple rule-based categorization." 204 As courts have struggled to manage these varied circumstances, the Court's vague rule has in turn generated the sort of
uncertainty in circuit court decisions that commentators like Rosenthal feared.2 05 The advantage of a rule is predictability, but without
any guide for its implementation, Garcetti sapped its proposed rule of
its intended value. 20 6
Additionally, the Court's foundation for a rule in the principles
of federalism and the separation of powers is not as solid as it appears.
In the quarter century in between Connick and Garcetti, federal courts
would not engage in an exhaustive analysis of a public employee's
speech unless it decided first, as a matter of law, that the employee
spoke on a matter of public concern. During this span then, "there
was no judicial review of routine employment decisions if the speech
related to the workplace or other private matters."2 0 7 The Court's
concern with avoiding excessive judicial intrusion may thus have been
exaggerated.
202 Daly, supra note 90, at 28.
203 See Rhodes, supranote 6, at 1192. Professor Dale has even asserted that Garcetti
"requires courts to undertake a case-by-case analysis of the nature of an employee's
duties and of the context of the employee's speech." Dale, supra note 56, at 209.
Accordingly, she argues that the circuit court decisions that stray from the formalist
viewpoint accurately reflect Garcetti's emphasis on the "fact-based nature of the
inquiry." Id. at 208.
204 Rhodes, supra note 6, at 1192.
205 See id. at 1194.
206 Id.
207 Daly, supra note 90, at 35.
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For Professor Charles W. Rhodes, the trouble with a prophylactic
rule in public employee speech cases exhibits itself in the ways circuit
courts can interpret Garcetti. On the one hand, courts could take a
narrow view, limiting speech that "the employer itself has commissioned or created." 20s Though this approach provides a more definitive classification of official duties, it conflicts with the Supreme
Court's stated interest in avoiding "committing the judiciary to an
'intrusive role' overseeing 'communications between and among government employees and their superiors in the course of official business."' 2 09 Taking a narrow course, courts would now have an
opportunity to intervene more often and protect a larger amount of
employee speech from the actions of the employer. On the other end
of the spectrum, courts could take a broad approach, "categorizing
any employee expression related to the tasks performed on the job as
official duty speech." 2 10 However, a broad inquiry defeats predictability and has the potential for encroachments on the First Amendment
interests of employees that Garcetti implicitly would have recognized
anyway. 2 1' As a compromise, Rhodes suggests an analysis that determines "whether disciplining the employee would silence his or her
ability to participate in public affairs," resting on comparisons to relevant citizen analogues. 212 Yet this compromise position also raises
serious doubts that courts can adequately differentiate between what
actions a citizen would have pursued in relation to what the public
employee actually did.2 13 For these reasons, Rhodes argues that a rule
is not feasible: "[W] hen the application of the rule depends on an
underlying categorization that is more ambiguous than the prior standard, the rule cannot serve its purposes."1 4
Lastly, many criticize Garcetti's "perverse incentive" as a Catch-22
that forces employees to choose between speaking, in turn risking
their continued employment, or remaining silent. Employees who
have an opportunity to expose misconduct are faced with a few
options: either (1) they can speak publicly and thus risk losing their
job for breaking the chain of command; (2) they can speak internally,
but they are not shielded from their employer's retaliatory action; or
(3) they can choose not to speak at all, and in doing so deprive the
208 See Rhodes, supra note 6, at 1195 (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410,
422 (2006)).
209 Id. at 1196 (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 423).
210 Id.
211 See id.
212 See id. at 1197.
213 See id.
214 Id. at 1198.
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general public of relevant information.2 1 5 What is more, if they do
choose to speak, Garcetti and its subsequent interpretations encourage
an employee to speak externally, thereby inviting a disruption in the
efficient operation of government that the Supreme Court sought to
protect in the first place. 2 16 Inevitably, the "predictable and unfortunate consequence .

.

. is the chilling impact on whistle-blowers whose

economic need for a job may outweigh the desire to correct government improprieties."2 17
In addition, the precautions that the Court relied upon to facilitate continued exposure of governmental misbehavior, namely internal mechanisms and current whistleblower statutes, are inadequate.
Any dependence on employers creating internal dissent mechanisms
is misplaced because it relegates the determination of whether an
employee can speak on a matter of public concern to the "grace" of
the employer.2 18 Though the precise extent of whistleblower statutes
is debatable, many have argued that they too are insufficient.2 1 9 And,
as Justice Souter argued, as statutes vary with jurisdiction, the scope of
statutory protection for public employee speech will necessarily fluctuate depending upon the applicable law. 2 2 0
3.

A Proposal to Reform the Public Employee Speech Analysis

To address the preliminary issue of whether an employee's
speech falls within the Garcetti scope of employment, circuit courts
should continue to engage in contextual analyses focusing on those
duties plainly required by employers as well as those tasks so intertwined as to be nearly inseparable. In making this determination,
courts should feel free to continue to use factors such as subject matter, audience, formal job descriptions, and comparisons to relevant
citizen analogues, though none of these should be dispositive.
A number of examples from the circuit courts stand out as stark
examples of how the foundational determination of the scope of offi215 See Sonya Bice, Note, Tough Talk from the Supreme Court on Free Speech: The Illusory
Per Se Rule in Garcetti as FurtherEvidence of Connick 's UnworkableEmployee/Citizen Speech
Partition, 8 J.L. Soc'v, Winter 2007, at 45, 80-83 (2007).
216 See id.
217 Chohan, supra note 174, at 592.
218 Daly, supra note 90, at 38.
219 See, e.g., id. at 40 (arguing that Garcetti "may overstate the level of protection
that exists for public employees" because "[t]he principal sources of protectionwhistleblower statutes-are sporadic and limited in scope"); Bice, supra note 215, at
79 ("[E]ven a cursory investigation reveals that expecting existing law to protect legitimate whistleblower claims is at best naive, at worst, facetious.").
220 See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 440-41 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting).
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cial duties would proceed under this new standard by examining the
various factors referenced above. For instance, the factually similar
cases in Nixon and Foley demonstrate when a court should find a public official to be speaking within his or her official duties based on the
lack of a relevant citizen analogue. When the police officer and fire
chief in each case spoke to the media, the fact that they were on duty,
in uniform, and involved in situations requiring the assistance of public officers (an automobile accident and a fire, respectively) inextrica22
bly tied their speech to the performance of their official tasks. '
Though the statements were not openly demanded of the employees,
the lack of any relevant parallel to the behavior of ordinary citizens
indicated the intimate link between their comments and the pursuit
of their plain duties as public officials representing their individual
departments. Consequently, in cases such as these, courts should not
extend the aegis of the First Amendment to the employee's speech.
The same reasoning also corresponds to certain cases where audience and subject matter play a central role in implementing this proposal. As an example of a case where the First Amendment would
apply, in Charles v. Grief 22 a systems analyst at the Texas Lottery Commission sent reports of racial discrimination by the Commission to the
Texas Legislature. 22 3 In combination with the lack of a "Garcetti-like
nexus between [the subject matter of the employee's] systems analyst's work and the malfeasance that he sought to expose to the cognizant public authorities," the decision to file the report through
external channels indicated that the speech should be placed outside
the analyst's "official duties." 22 4 Likewise, in Thomas, the court should
not have deemed the building code inspector's discovery of a prematurely signed certificate to be "official-duty" speech because he
reported the illegal behavior to the Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation. 225 Admittedly, the speech stemmed from a discovery made in
pursuit of the inspector's official duties. Yet the act of reporting the
wrongdoing to a state investigative agency could not be considered
nearly inseparable from his plainly required duties of building
inspection.

221 See Foley v. Town of Randolph, 598 F.3d 1, 2-3 (1st Cir. 2010); Nixon v. City of
Houston, 511 F.3d 494, 496-97 (5th Cir. 2007).
222 522 F.3d 508 (5th Cir. 2008).
223

See id. at 510.

224
225

Id. at 514.
See Thomas v. City of Blanchard, 548 F.3d 1317, 1319-20 (10th Cir. 2008).
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Though this is not as narrow of a proposal as some have put forth
in the past,22 6 it should be seen as an effort to curtail the tendencies of
some circuits to expand their view of what constitutes "official duties."
Courts should take caution not to adhere so rigidly to an either/or
approach in evaluating whether a public employee spoke as a citizen
or as an employee as to lose sight of the possibility that there may be
situations where an employee's speech, though arising from an official
duty, may not be part and parcel of those duties. Where certain circuits have framed the inquiry to include speech with a tenuous relation to an employee's clearly defined responsibilities, there is a danger
that this opens the door to an overly comprehensive view of the scope
of employment. Just as the Garcetti majority dreaded employers drawing up excessively broad job descriptions, the judiciary may end up
doing exactly that if courts carry this current reasoning further.
Even now, existing precedent may instill fear among public
employees that commenting on issues of clear public importance will
fall under their official duties, thereby inducing employees to turn a
blind eye to these matters. For example, in Abdur-Rahman v.
Walker,22 7 the Eleventh Circuit denied any application of the First
Amendment to county sewer inspectors who drew their supervisors'
attention to the county's noncompliance with state and federal
laws.22 8 The inspectors had been hired to formulate ordinances about
the disposal of fat, oil, and grease as well as to investigate the causes of
sewer overflows. 2 2 9 Yet the court refused to differentiate between
those reports that dealt specifically with sewer flows and those that
dealt with noncompliance. 230 Because "all of their speech 'owe [d] its
226 See, e.g., Norton, supra note 201, at 83 (arguing that the "First Amendment
should be understood to permit government to claim as its own-and thus controlthe speech of public employees that the government has specifically hired to deliver a
particular viewpoint that is clearly governmental in origin and thus open to the public's meaningful credibility and accountability checks"); id. at 85 ("[O]nly the speech
of public employees engaged to speak for the government-i.e., those specifically hired
to deliver a transparently government message-should be considered the government's own speech that is exempt from First Amendment scrutiny."); Suma, supra
note 88, at 386 (asserting that courts "should construe job duties narrowly, with reference to the specific, explicit requirements of the employer rather than broad, implicit
obligations" because "[n]arrow construction of job duties allows courts to protect
individual and public interests in an employee's speech, and these interests can be
significant").
227 567 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2009).
228 See id. at 1283.
229 See id. at 1279-80.
230 See id. at 1284 ("It cannot be that the job duties of the inspectors were so
narrow that they encompassed only a portion of the reports their job precipitated.").

THE

2011]1

DEVELOPMENT

OF PUBLIC

EMPLOYEE

SPEECH

873

existence to' those [official] duties," the Constitution could not apply
to any of it.23 1 However, this line of reasoning overlooks the fact that
the inspectors were not conducting their investigations with the purpose of assessing compliance with state and federal law.
Comparing this opinion with Thomas, a difference that immediately stands out is the inspectors' choice to speak to their superiors
rather than to an external agency. Indeed, the court admitted as
much when it noted that the choice to speak to superiors suggested
"that the inspectors did not believe that raising concerns about sewer
overflows was exclusively the responsibility of someone else in some
other unit of their department and that they did not take a narrow,
rigid view of their own responsibilities." 2 3 2 Although this choice may
be indicative, it cannot overshadow that, just like the building inspector in Thomas, the sewer inspectors went beyond their established
duties to call attention to their agency's noncompliance with the law.
On a more abstract level, the case epitomizes how the current
approach incentivizes public employees to keep quiet and focus firmly
on those duties that they know are required of them, rather than risking their careers to shed light on illicit conduct. When the courts thus
impede a public employee's ability to raise these matters to their
superiors, they promote a culture of willful ignorance instead of one
that seeks to address and correct governmental shortcomings in the
most efficient manner. It is the public, then, who ultimately loses out
under this system.
Even where the scope of employment is not seriously in question,
there will indubitably be situations in which a public employee is
speaking on a matter of public concern, such as exposing official misconduct, while speaking within the purview of his or her official
duties. Because there is a compelling accountability and efficiency
interest in granting the government as an employer some flexibility in
controlling the speech of its employees, this should tip the scales
slightly in favor of management. However, these interests do not warrant a complete disregard for the value of having public employees
speak on matters of clear public significance. Indeed, it might be best
for purposes of efficiency to encourage public employees to file their
complaints internally by offering them the prospect of protection for
those important matters, rather than risk the complications that arise
from employees leaking information to outside audiences. Furthermore, the fact that an employee speaks internally does not mechanically transform his speech from being a matter of public concern to a
231

Id. (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006)).

232

Id.
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mere grievance. To be sure, the accountability interest is more evident when an employee speaks to the general public. But this does
not mean that the same results cannot be attained when an employee
stirs the pot internally, and possibly at less expense to the office or
agency.
For these reasons, the courts should adopt a standard modeled
on Pickering/ Connick for cases involving an employee speaking pursuant to his or her official duties, but with a slight modification in the
form of a presumption that the government's efficiency interest will
prevail unless the court can first determine that the speech was of
such manifest public worth as to plainly deserve protection under the
First Amendment. 2 3 3 This presumption reflects the need to preserve
governmental efficiency in managerial contexts. But a purely formalistic approach is improper to meet the multitude of employment scenarios that continue to arise in the lower courts. Garcetti's categorical
ruling cannot accept the very real possibility of public employees
speaking within their official duties on matters of strong public concern. Moreover, as evidenced by the variety of methods that circuit
courts use to determine the scope of employment, the formalistic rule
has not provided the kind of predictability that proponents of Garcetti
have cited. If the choice has come down to opting between a formalistic rule and a balancing standard, neither of which offer strong
degrees of adjudicative certainty, it would be better to take the standard that recognizes the intricate realities of public employee speech.
To illustrate how courts would bring this balancing approach into
operation, certain employment scenarios already handled by the circuits elucidate how the analysis would function. In Fox, the school
teacher's protests that her caseload exceeded that allowable by law did
not hold any larger public significance beyond an individual
employee grievance.2 34 In filing her complaint, she did not seek to
expose any wider practice of alleged illegal behavior by the school
district. The same can be said of the case heard by the Seventh Circuit
in Mills v. City of Evansville23 5 where a police officer voiced her unease
over the viability of planned departmental reassignments.2 3 6 Again,
the officer's speech contained no matter of substantial public relevance; it merely reflected a public employee's concerns about a pro233 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968); Connick v. Myers, 461
U.S. 138, 147 (1983).
234 See Fox v. Traverse City Area Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 605 F.3d 345, 347 (6th Cir.
2010).
235 452 F.3d 646 (7th Cir. 2006).
236 See id. at 647.
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posed managerial decision. Certainly neither of these examples
exceeds a presumption in favor of the employer.
Conversely, the Third Circuit's reasoning in Reilly v. City of Atlantic City237 indirectly provides a paradigm for public employee speech
on a matter of public concern that outweighs the employer presumption. In that case, a police officer claimed that his superiors retaliated
against him because of his participation in an investigation, including
giving trial testimony.2 3 8 The court acknowledged that the officer's
testimony stemmed from his official duties in the investigation, but
nevertheless held that the First Amendment applied to his speech
because of his duty as a citizen to testify truthfully, thereby protecting
"the integrity of the judicial process and . . . insulat[ing] that process
from outside pressure."2 39 Such a duty, as the court implicitly
accepted, undoubtedly prevails in the face of the government's efficiency interest. 24 0
Unfortunately, because of Garcetti's formalistic nature, several
decisions by the circuits impede the advantages to be gained through
the protected exercise of employee speech of strong public consequence. One recurring theme among these cases is the classic
whistleblower scenario involving public corruption, exemplified by
the Phillips case where a city clerk sought to expose the mayor's
2 41 Judging
alleged misappropriation of funds and sexual harassment.
that the reports fell within the clerk's official duties, the court rendered a chilling effect on public employees, thus jeopardizing future
efforts to address corruption allegations that would have resulted had
employees been given a prospect of protection in speaking out.
Accordingly, Phillips and cases like it throughout the courts of
appealS24 2 deny the public any possible curative benefits of an
237 532 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2008).
238 See id. at 219.
239 Id. at 231.
240 See id. ("That an employee's official responsibilities provided the initial impetus to appear in court is immaterial to his/her independent obligation as a citizen to
testify truthfully.").
241 See Phillips v. City of Dawsonville, 499 F.3d 1239, 1240-41 (11th Cir. 2007).
242 See Fairley v. Andrews, 578 F.3d 518, 520 (7th Cir. 2009) (involving a prison
guard reporting misconduct by other guards including the beating of prisoners);
Abdur-Rahman v. Walker, 567 F.3d 1278, 1279 (11th Cir. 2009) (concerning sewer
inspectors who expressed their concerns about the county's compliance with the
Clean Water Act); Thomas v. City of Blanchard, 548 F.3d 1317, 1319 (10th Cir. 2008)
(involving a building inspector who reported suspected illegality by the City Clerk);
Thompson v. District of Columbia, 530 F.3d 914, 916 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (concerning
the corruption investigation of an employee of the District of Columbia Lottery and
Charitable Games Board); Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1079-80 (7th Cir.
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employee's speech if the allegations seem genuine. Furthermore,
where an employee speaks to superiors or other public employees, as
did the clerk in Phillips, 2 4 3 Garcetti's chilling effect generates the "perverse incentive" insofar as it precludes the employee's choice to speak
internally. The employee's only remaining option, apart from
remaining silent altogether, is to communicate to external parties,
thus raising threats to governmental efficiency.
The same concerns are manifest in public employee speech
regarding governmental performance where that performance is deficient or dangerous. In Foraker,the court declined to extend constitutional protection to the police officers who exposed the deteriorating
conditions posing health and safety issues at their firing range. 2 44 Following decisions like these,24 5 there is no longer any impetus for public employees to call attention to inadequacies in their employer's
operation, including matters that might threaten the welfare of fellow
employees or even the public at large.
CONCLUSION

Though Garcetti did not supply precise contours for its "scope of
employment" inquiry, the circuit courts have developed their own
variety of factors for handling the determination, drawing from the
Supreme Court's own language as well as creating their own unique
approaches. In light of the foregoing analysis of these interpretations
of Garcetti, the initial question of determining a public employee's
scope of employment should be answered by resorting to a contextual
analysis that focuses on those duties either plainly required by employers or so intertwined as to be nearly inseparable. Those cases that do
2008) (involving the Deputy Chief Counsel of the Illinois Gaming Board alleging
wrongdoing by the Governor); Vose v. Kliment, 506 F.3d 565, 570 (7th Cir. 2007)
(concerning a police officer investigating misconduct by fellow officers).
243 See Phillips, 499 F.3d at 1241 ("Nothing indicates that Plaintiff ever communicated her concerns about the then Mayor's conduct to anyone outside of the city's
employment.").
244 See Foraker v. Chaffinch, 501 F.3d 231, 243 (3d Cir. 2007), abrogated by Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488 (2011) (abrogating Foraker's distinction
between the protections afforded by the Speech and Petition Clauses of the First
Amendment).
245 See Rohrbough v. Univ. of Colo. Hosp. Auth., 596 F.3d 741, 743-44 (10th Cir.
2010) (involving a hospital employee who reported instances of substandard care and
the misallocation of a heart transplant); Bivens v. Trent, 591 F.3d 555, 557 (7th Cir.
2010) (concerning an Illinois State Police officer who reported safety issues at a firing
range); Green v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 472 F.3d 794, 796 (10th Cir. 2007) (involving
a drug-lab technician who commented on the inaccuracy of the lab's testing
procedures).
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involve a public employee speaking pursuant to his or her official
duties should be resolved by a modified Pickering/ Connick balancing
standard instead of Garcetti's formalistic rule.
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